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In the Supreme Court.
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

\ Case No. 7406

JOE PETRALIA,

(

Defendant and Appellant. }

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the defendant, Joe Petralia, from
the verdict of the jury finding him guilty of the crime of Grand
Larceny, and the sentence of the court thereon.
The brief of appellant contains a summary of the facts
which were presented to the court and jury upon which the
3
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defendant was convicted and duly sentenced. Although appellant's brief presents the facts in a manner to best serve the
arguments of appellant in his Statement of Errors, it is felt
that a recapitulation here would serve no useful purpose.
Respondent will therefore refrain from making an independent
presentation of the facts at this time but will do so where
necessary in order to portray a version which may be at
variance with that of the appellant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The court did not err in denying defendant's motion
for a new trial.
II. The defendant was not prejudiced by the contempt
proceedings.
III. The court did not unreasonably restrict the voir dire
examination of the prospective jurors to the prejudice of the
defendant.
IV. The court did not err in admitting in evidence the
testimony of Wayne Smith and various State's exhibits.
V. The court did not commit prejudicial error in instructing the jury.
VI. The court did not err in refusing to give to the JUry
defendant's requested instruction No. 1.
VII. The court did not err in refusing to give to the jury
defendant's requested instruction No. 5.
4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
This Honorable Court has on numerous occasions held
that the granting or refusing of a motion for a new trial
rests exclusively in: the sound discretion of the trial court
and that the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed
unless it appears that it has been abused to the prejudice of
the defendant. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P. (2d) 167;
State v. Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P. 635; State v. Montgomery,
37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815.
An examination of the record in this case will reveal
that grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 set forth in appellant's Motion
for New Trial were not supported by affidavits as required
by the provisions of Section 105-39-4, Utah Code Annotated
1943, and therefore may not now be considered. It is respectfully submitted that the record does not reveal that the
trial court abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant
in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant contends that the court committed prejudicial
error in imposing and levying a fine upon the defendant for

5
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contempt of court (Br. 26). Withdut assuming one way or
the other whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing a contempt fine of $208.00 or whether His Honor acted
~apriciously and arbitrarily in finding the deefndant in contempt of court and in requiring him to pay a fine of $208.00
to purge himself, respondent respectfully submits that the
record shows that the defendant was not prejudiced by this
action. It will be noted that no jurors were present in the
court room during the contempt proceedings (Br. 4), and
kppellant fails to point out where any rulings or orders during
·the course of the trial appear to have been influenced by any
daimed bias or prejudice of His Honor as a result of the
contempt proceedings.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT UNREASONABLY RESTRICT THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF THE
PROSPECTIVE JURORS TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
DEFENDANT.
I

Appellant contends that the defendant was prejudiced by
the manner in which he claims the court unduly and arbitrarily
restricted the examination of the prospective jurors upon voir
dire (Br. 29). The purpose of the voir dire examination is
to secure for the defendant an impartial and disinterested jury,
and he must therefore be given a reasonable opportunity to
obtain such a jury. It is always essential, however, that the
examination be conducted in good faith and, so that prejudice
will not be engendered, it is within the exercise of the wise
6
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discretion of the court to safeguard the course of the questioning. Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. (2d) 224. An exatnination of the transcript will reveal that defendant's counsel
questioned fourteen of the sixteen prospective jurors called
to the jury box at great length in selecting the jury which
would try the case ( Tr. 4-15). This was so even though the
court did indicate that it might limit counsel's questions (Tr.
5). As a matter of fact, the only admonition given by the
court in the course of counsel's examination was that his
examination be limited to interrogating rather than lecturing
the jury (Tr. 6), and, that the examination of Mr. Jensen was
repetitious on the question of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant (Tr. 7). In answer to counsel's prior questions,
Mr. Jensen had already stated that he had formed no opinion
concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant (Tr. 6).
It may be interesting to note here that not only did the
court not prevent or even suggest that the examination of the
prospective jurors be discontinued but there was no attempt
made by counsel for appellant to challenge any of the prospective jurors for cause. Furthermore, the record shows that
Mr. Jensen, the prospective juror whom counsel for appellant
cites as an example where the voir dire examination was
claimed to have been unduly and arbitrarily restricted, was
not one of the jurors who tried the case.
It is respectfully submitted that the record fails to· support
the contention that the voir dire examination of the jurors
was unduly and arbitrarily restricted to the prejudice of the
defendant.
7
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POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF WAYNE SMITH AND
VARIOUS STATE'S EXHIBITS.
It is contended that the court committed error in admitting
in evidence State's Exhibits "B," "C," "E," "F," "G," "H,"

"1," "]," "K," and "M" and the testimony of Wayne Smith.
the only objection to such exhibits and the disputed testimony
both at the time of introduction and as argued in appellant's
brief was that the same were "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial."
With reference to the stock objection that the evidence
or testimony is "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," it
was said in Hungate v. Hudson, 353 Mo. 944, 185 SW (2d)
646, 157 A.L.R. 598, that:

" * * * as a rule, the general objections of irrelevancy
and immateriality call for no more action on the part
of the court than the assigned objections imply,-i£
more is expected or required of the court or there are
other reasons the cross-examination is improper or the
evidence is inadmissible specific objections must be
made for those reasons."
In the course of its opinion the Missouri court went on further
to hold, in substance, that the admission in evidence of facts
entirely immaterial to the issues and without probative force
is not reversible error, especially when the facts evidenced
are of such a character that they do not have a natural tendency
to inflame or arouse hostile passions and their prejudicial
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effect is not otherwise made to appear.
Assuming, merely for purpose of argument, that part or
all of the exhibits and the testimony referred to were "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," counsel for appellant
does not claim that prejudicial error was committed by the
court. In referring to the disputed exhibits and testimony,
counsel's only argument concerning their inadmissibility is
as follows: (Br. 35)
"None of this was ever brought home to Petralia,
and all was mere 'dressing,' and attempts to prove in
advance that which was not contradicted.
"Manifestly irrelevant and incompetent."
Dealing generally with the admission of tmproper evidence, it is said in 5 C. J. S. 1009, Sec. 1732:
"It is a well-settled general rule that it is harmless
error for the court, in the conduct of the trial, to permit
the introduction of irrelevant, incompetent, or other
improper evidence relating to a fact which is admitted,
conceded, uncontroverted, or which has been placed
beyond the realm of dispute by uncontradicted evidence
which has been adduced, or by agreement or stipulation
of the parties; since, under the circumstances, the
evidence could not mislead the jury.''
The rule generally recognized by the authorities is that
anounced by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma in
L. 0. & H. L. Street v. Arnold, 40 P. (2d) 1050, 170 Okla.
389, wherein it was said:
"One who complains that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence, over his obje~tions, must be able
9
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to show wherein said evidence was detrimental to liis
cause."
In this case, aside from the fact that counsel for appellant
~omplains that the disputed evidence and testimony was "in~
~ompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," there is no showing
whatsoever that it was prejudicial or of such a character as to
have a tendency to inflame or arouse the hostile passions of
the jury. On the contrary, it is submitted that a careful reading
of the transcript will show the competency, relevancy and
!llateriality. of the disputed evidence and, that in any event, no
harmful error was committed in its admission.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY.
It is strenuously urged by counsel for appellant that·
the court committed prejudicial and reversible error in using
the phrase "from the immediate presence" rather than "from
the person" in instructing the jury concerning the crime of
Grand Larceny in Instructions No. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11. It is
true, as appellant contends, that in instructing the jury the
court did state that Grand Larceny is committed when the
property is taken "from the immediate presence" rather than
"from the person" of another, as set forth in subsection 2 of
Section 103-36-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Courts have
held, however, that the phrase "from the person" is substitutionary or tantamount in meaning to the phrase "from the
immediate presence." Mahoney v. State, 180 NE 580; Porello
10
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State, 121 Ohio St. 280, 168 NE 135; State v. Lamb, 242
Mo. 398, 146 SW 1169; People v. Kubish, 357 Ill. 531, 192
NE 543; State v. Craft, 299 Mo. 332, 253 SW 224; O'Donnell
v. People, 224 Ill. 218, 79 NE 639; and Jackson v. State, 114
Ga. 826, 40 SE 1001.

'v.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court- of the State of Utah
in State v. O'Day, 93 Utah 387, 73 P. (2d) 965, stated:
"We have read the transcript carefully, and, if any
property was taken, it was taken from the person or
immediate presence of complaining witness, so it could
not be less than grand larceny or robbery."
Counsel for appellant admits that there was evidence that
property was taken from the "immediate presence" of Steve
and Anazawa (Br. 39}. Ifl view of the judicial construction
which has been placed on the phrase "from the person," it
cannot be argued successfully that prejudicial error was committed by the court in instructing the jury as it did concerning
the crime of Grand Larceny.
It is urged also that the court committed prejudicial error
in giving Instruction No. 9 in that it unduly commented upon
the evidence and assumed as a fact that Steve and Anazawa
were robbed. Co~nsel argues that "the instruction, as given,
was calculated to carry the thought to the jury that the judge in
the case thought the defendant guilty," and concludes that,
"the form of this instruction ought not to be approved, although it may not be sufficient standing alone to justify a
new trial (Br. 41). Whatever inferences may be drawn from
the language in Instruction No. 9, that instruction must be
11
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construed in harmony with and considered in the light of all
the other instructions which were given. Any inferences,
whether reasonable or unreasonable, which could be drawn
from the language of that instruction to the effect that the
judge thought a robbery had been committed or that the
defendant was guilty, were certainly negatived by His Honor
in instructing the jury in Instruction No. 27 as follows:
·'The court does not express any opinion of any of
the facts in the case, and it is immaterial what the views
of the court thereon may be. Neither by these instructions nor by any words uttered or remarks made during
the trial does the court intimate or mean or wish to be
understood as giving an opinion as to what the proof
is or what it is not, or what the facts are or what are
not the facts in this case."
The instructions pointed out specifically that the burden
was on the state to prove every material allegation in the information beyond a reasonable doubt; that the defendant was
not required to prove his defense of alibi beyond a reasonable
doubt but should be acquitted if the evidenced raised a reasonable doubt as to his presence at the time and place of the commission of the crime; that a conviction could not be had upon
the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices; and, that the
defendant was presumed to be innocent until proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is respectfully submitted that
with these and the other precautionary instructions which
were given and more particularly with the admonition of
the court in Instruction No. 27 that, "Neither by these instructions nor by any words uttered or remarks made during the
trial does the court intimate or mean or wish to be understood
12
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as to what the proof is or what it is not, or what the facts are
or what are not the facts," the court did not err in giving Instruction No. 9.
POINT VI.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.1.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 was as follows:
"You are instructed to return a verdict of 'not guilty'
in favor of the defendant and to so say by your verdict."
In connection with this requested instruction, it is argued that
the evidence in the case did not corrobate the testimony of
he witness, Salerno, and that it was the duty of the court to
determine as a matter of law whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to corrobate his testimony. Section 105-32-18, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, does prohibit a finding of guilty upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. It reads:
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of
an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the testimony
of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense; and the corroboration
shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission
of the offense or the circumstances thereof."
The general rule with reference to whether or not there
is a legal sufficiency of evidence to warrant its submission to
the jury is set forth in 23 C. J. S. 651, Sec. 1139, as follows:
13
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"Whether there is a legal sufficiency of evidence
in support of the material issues of the case which will
warrant its submission to the jury is a question of law
for the court, in determining which it is only necessary
that there should be so much proof as to make it proper
to submit the evidence to the jury, and not that the
court should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence of motive alone is not sufficient to take the
case to the jury. Where, however, there is any evidence,
however slight, on which the jury may justifiably find
the existence or the nonexistence of material facts in
issue, and the evidence is conflicting, or of such a
character that different conclusions as to such facts
reasonably may be drawn therefrom, the issues should
be submitted to the jury for determination, even though
the court does not beJ ieve the evidence, or is of the
opinion that it is not sufficient to convict, or is doubtful
whether the evidence presented will be convincing to
the jury. In such a case, it is error for the court to take
the issue from the jury by dismissal or nonsuit, or by
the direction of a verdict, or by excluding the evidence
from the jury."
In commenting upon the corroborative evidence in the record,
counsel for appellant admits that there is some evidence but
goes on to say, "when all is said and done, it is largely a
matter of impression with the reviewing court, whether or not
the case should have been taken from the jury." Thus, by
his own admission, it would have been error for the court
to have withdrawn the case from the jury even though the
evidence of corroboration may have been slight and even
though the court may not have believed the evidence.
A perusal of the record shows that the evidence amply
supports and corroborates the testimony of Tony Salerno.
The testimony of George Pappas shows that on or about July
1·1
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·12, 1948, Joe Petralia called him by telephone and told him
that he wanted to give the money back if there was a way
(Tr. 45-6). Also, during the course of a conversation in Bell,
California, on July 15, 1948, that Joe Petralia told him the
boys only got about $17,600 and· t~at in the get-away they
·lost between $400-$500 silver dollp.rs (Tr. 47-8). Later,
when George Pappas asked Joe Petralia about a gun of his
which he claimed the boys had taken, Joe replied that one
of the boys had thrown iJ oyt" of the car on the right side
- on the highway where the viaduct is located (Tr. 49). Furthermore, during that visit, Joe Petralia made arrangerp.ents
to return $6,000.00 to George Pappas in a shoe box (Tr. 50).
The record shows, too, that as Joe Petralia was taking George
Pappas to the station to return to Ogden, Utah, he did give
George Pappas a package (Tr. 53). Such testimony certainly
corroborated the testimony of Tony Salerno in associating
and implicating the defendant, Joe Petralia, in the offense for
which he was finally convicted. These actions, if the testimony
can be believed, do not evidence anything other than the fact
that Joe Petralia did participate in and was guilty of the
offense for which he was convicted .
The testimony of Harry Pappas substantiated the testimony
of George Pappas that his brother George did receive a package from Joe Petralia containing $6,000.00. This, too, it
is submitted, corroborates the testimony of Tony Salerno
(Tr. 85-6).
The testimony of Fae Shelby Rugg shows that Joe
Petralia called upon Tony Salerno at an auto court at Bell,
California, in the spring of 1948 (Tr. 242-3-4). That during
15
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the course of the conversation they (Joe Petralia and Tony
Salerno) talked about money and insurance (Tr. 245), and
that it wouldn't cost Harry and George anything because they
were heavily insured (Tr. 245). Not only was she a witness
to that conversation, but she herself had a conversation with
Joe Petralia following the robbery, at which time she told
him that he'd been very clever in all his maneuvers except in
not seeing Tony Salerno (Tr. 248). Can it be said that this,
along with all the other evidence in the record, does not
implicate the defendant Joe Petralia and corroborate the testimony of Tony Salerno ?
Finally, the testimony of the policeman, Henry Allred,
was to the effect he had known Joe Petralia for approximately
fifteen years prior to the robbery of the Club and that he had
seen Joe near the door of the Alexander Cafe on 25th and
Lincoln Streets in Ogden, Utah, on June 24, 1948, the night
before the robbery (Tr. 251).
It is respectfully submitted that to deny that the above
and the other evidence in the record corroborates the testimony of Tony Salerno in implicating him with the offense for
which he was convicted, is to refuse to admit the obvious.
POINT VII
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.5.
Counsel for appellant argues that the court committed
16
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prejudicial error in refusing to give defendant's requested
Instruction No. 5 which attempted to submit to the jury·· the
question of whether a robbery was in fact committed or
whether the whole ~bing was a "frame-up" or "phoney."
Counsel urges that the jury should have been given an opportunity to consider the "realities."

In answering this argument it is submitted that a review
of the record will establish without question that of necessity
the jury must have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant, Joe Petralia, was guilty of the offense for
which he was convicted and that the offense was in truth and
in fact actually committed. Rather than being a matter of
submitting the question of the realities to the jury, it appears
that counsel for appellant would have the jury, His Honor at
the trial below and the members of This Honorable Court
close their eyes to all reality.

CONCLUSION

A review of the entire record and the law in relation
thereto reveals that the defendant, Joe Petralia, was afforded
a fair trial in accordance with established legal principles
and that the proceedings were free from prejudicial error.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the verdict of the
jury finding him guilty of the crime of Grand Larceny and
17
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the judgment of the court thereon should be affirmed by this
Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Assistant Attorney Gene1'al
Attorneys for Respondent

18
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